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ARTICLES
THE POLITICS OF ADVERTISING
LEE LOEVlNGER*

Once upon a tune It was respectable to be engaged m busmess m the
Uruted States. Today public oplll1on experts tell us that busmess IS
held m low esteem by the majorIty of people.l Self-styled public mterest
groups claIm a copYrIght on respectability and speak of busmess as
though It were a SOCIal disease and advertlsmg as though It were slighdy
worse than skyJackmg. While castigauon ranges across the field of
busmess acuvity broadly enough to aVOId any claIm of discnmmauon,
some of the most VIgorous attacks are mounted agamst adverusmg. The
CrIUCISm IS epItomIZed by the charge of an adverusmg man that our
culture IS rotten and that advenlsmg has helped make It SO and IS contmumg to make It worse.2 Woven through the CrItlCISmS are demands
for a vanety of reforms and regulauons, rangmg from proposals to pro• B.A., JD., Uruversity of Minnesota. Parmer, Hogan & Hartson, WashIngton, D. C.,
Fonner ComnusslOner, Federal CommurucatIons ComnusslOn; Fonner AsSOCIate JustIce,
Minnesota Supreme Court.
Tlus Arocle IS a slightly edited versIon of a paper presented to the InternatIonal
Radio and TeleVISIon SOCIety at the Waldorf-Astona Hotel, New York, N.Y., on
January 4, 1973. The editIng has been confined to changes of ,wording and constructIon
and the additIon of fOOOlotes; the substance IS unchanged. Although the paper was
ongmally drafted In the latter part of 1972, events SInce that orne have strongly reInforced the conclusIOns reached and the VIews expressed. The OpImons In the case of
ColumbIa BroadcastIng System v. DemocratIc Nat'l COIruruttee, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973),
appear very nearly to establish the thesIS urged here: Government actIon to requIre the
broadcastIng of partIcular VIews In the commercIal area IS InconsIStent WIth or contrary
to the mandate of the first amendment.
1. See, e.g., BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 16, 1972, at 70. Numerous public opImon polls
-report declirung public confidence In and respect for "bIg bUSIness."
2. BUSINESS WEEK, June 10, 1972, at 46.
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lllbit varIOUS lands of advertIsmg and to limIt the amount of advertIsmg
generally, through proposals to requrre "correctIve," or self..:mcnmmatmg, advertISmg as well as sCIentIfic substantIatIon for all advertIsmg
claIffiS, to a proposal that every broadcast advertISement be followed
or matched by a counter-advertIsement presumably contradictIhg whatever claImS are made m the advertISement. Strangely enough, It appears
that the attacks are mcreasmg at the very tIme that performance IS
ImproVIng.
The counter-advertIsmg proposal IS potentIally the most far-reachmg
of the varIOUS attacks. Its genealogy 15 farrly clear, ongihanng wIth the
decIsIOn of the Federal CommumcatIons CommIssIon m 1949 that broadcasters could express editonal 0p1ll1ons on licensed facilitIes but that they
must also provIde a farr opportumty for the expressIOn of opposmg or
contrastmg VIews on controversIal ISsues of public Importance. 3 ThIS
prmcIple, whIch came to be known as the "Farrness Doctrme," until
1967 was applied only to the diSCUSSIOn of major politIcal and SOCIal
ISSues. In that year, the FCC declared that the Farrness Doctrme applied to CIgarette advertIsmg to the extent of requrrmg public servIce
announcements warnmg of the dangers of CIgarette smokmg.4 The
ComffilSsIon 0pImon qUIte expliCItly and emphatIcally declared that the
SItuatIOn WIth respect to CIgarettes was "umque." In 1964 there had
been a report by a Surgeon General's AdVISOry CommIttee warmng that
ctgarette smolang was hazardous to health, and m 1965 Congress had
enacted a statute requrrmg a warnmg of such hazard to be carned on all
CIgarette packages. The FCC brushed aSIde the argument that applicatIon of the Farrness Doctrme to commercIal advertISmg was an unwarranted and dangerous extensIOn by saymg that It did not know of
any other advertIsed product to wruch the ruling would be applicable,
that the ruling was limIted to CIgarettes, and that the ruling did not
Imply that "any appeal to the ComffilSsion by a vocal mmonty will
suffice to classify advertISmg of a product as controversIal and of public
Importance." 5
Although the CIgarette ruling of the FCC was sustamed by the Court
of Appeals for the ThStflct of ColumbIa CirCUIt on the basIS urged by
the FCC that the SItuatIOn was umque, G the same court, withm three
3. EditonaIizmg by Broadcast Llcensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
4. TelevlSlon Statton WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967); Cigarette AdvertlSmg, 9
F.C.C.2d 921 (1967).
5. Cigarette Advernsmg, 9 F.C.C.2d 921, 943 (1967).
6. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), eert. dented, 396 U.s. 842 (1969)
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years, held that the ComIlllSsIOn could not aVOId applymg the F arrness
Doctrme to other commercIal adverusements. Thus, It was held that
reply tune under the F arrness Doctrme was reqUIred for commercIals
of a department store willch was the obJect of a uruon boycott7 and for
commercIals adverusmg illgh powered cars and leaded illgh octane
gasoline. 8
As complamts agamst advertlSmg under the Farrness Doctrme mcreased dramatically, the ComIlllSsion began to be concerned about the
growmg extensIOn of that prmClple and mstItuted a general mqurry
mto the entire subJect. 9 In January 1972, the Federal Trade ComffilsslOn
filed a statement m the FCC Farrness Doctrme mqurry advocatIng that
the FCC reqUIre all broadcasters to provIde substantial amounts of tune,
both free and paId, for regularly scheduled "counter-adverusmg" on a
broad scale. Tills proposal IS still bemg debated and consldered.l°
The FTC counter-advertIsmg proposal echoes sunilar schemes urged
by other busmess CritiCS and has engendered support from most of the
militant anti-establishment camps. Of all the attacks on advertISmg, tills
proposal IS the most basIC, the most bold, and the most patently political.
Its potential benefits and dangers are not so ObVIOUS, however, and appraIsal requIres detailed analySIS.
On first tmpresslOn there IS plausibility to the argument that SInce
the public IS exposed to a vast amount of advertISIng urgmg the purchase
of products or servICes, there should be comparable opportumty proVIded for those who WISh to urge contrary VIews. Nevertheless, when
the proposal IS reduced to specifics and exammed closely, ItS plausibility
disappears, VIrtually all valid conSIderations are seen to militate agamst
It, and tmplicatIons are disclosed reachIng far beyond broadcastmg and
advertISIng and deep Into our political life.
7. Retail Store Employees Uruon v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8. Fnends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C; Crr. 1971), on remtmd, 33
F.C.C.2d 648 (1972).
9. Alan F Neckntz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971).
10. It appears that for several reasons the counter-advernsmg proposal IS less favorably regarded than It was several months ago. A new member of the FTC, Mayo J.
Thompson, has expressed reservattons about the proposal, stanng that "the pracnce
mIght well create more problems than It solves." BNA A.NTrrnusr & TRADE REG. REP. No.
618, at D-1 (June. 19, 1973). The term of Nicholas Johnson, the FCC commISSIoner
most notonously hostile to broadcasnng and favorable to counter-advernsmg, has
ended, and the Wlute House has made It clear that he will not be reappomted.
Furthermore, the deCISIon of the Supreme Court in ColumbIa Broadcasnng System v.
Democrattc Nat'l CommIttee, 93 S. Ct. 2080 (1973), sustammg the FCC In Its reJectton
of claImS to a nght of COmm~!CIal access, has diverted attentton from the proposal.
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1. The Reasons Urged for Counter-Advertmng Are Logtcally

Fallaczous
The mstItutIon of general counter-advertIsmg IS urged by the FTC
on the grounds that there are faults ill advertIsmg wIth whIch the FTC
cannot cope effectIvely because of Its limIted tools and resources. Faults
specIfied by the FTC are advertIsmg claIms whIch are false or deceptIve,
whIch are truthful but mcomplete, or whIch illvolve controversIal opmIon or eVIdence. Although the FTC states that not all commercIals raIse
the kmd of Issues or illvolve the type of problems that make counteradverusmg appropnate, It also asserts that the measures It proposes are
necessItated by advertIsmg whIch IS silent about any negatIve aspects of a
product, a charactenstIc the FTC urges IS mherent m all commercIal
advertISmg. Thus, the FTC IS Itself mconslstent and contradictory m
assertIng that ItS proposal IS responsIve to problems created only by
certam types of advertISIng but that such problems are Inherent m all
advertISIng.
In any event, neIther of these mconslStent premISes logIcally supports
the proposal. The FTC does not allege that the advertISIng faults It
IdentIfies are confined to broadcast commercIals. However, SInce counter-advertISIng IS proposed only for broadcastIng, It IS not necessarily
responsIve to the problems whIch allegedly requIre ItS InStitutIOn. Indeed, the advertISIng VIces noted by the FTC seem to prOVIde more an
excuse for beratIng advertisers than a baSIS for proposIng some partIcular
remedy, SInce there IS nothIng In the proposal whIch would make
counter-advertISIng responsIve, or even relevant, to any particular defect
In advertISIng or clrums.
For thIs reason, counter-advertISIng IS not really relevant to the FaIrness DoctrIne, whIch IS ItS ostensible logIcal support. The FaIrness DoctrIne applies only to specIfic ISSUes and requIres that OppOSIng VIewPOInts be Identified WIth respect to each ISsue and be gIVen a faIr opportumty for broadcast expressIon. The FTC, however, proposes measures
whIch would permIt the expreSSIOn of speCIal VIews WIthout any proVISIon for Insunng that Issues be IdentIfied, that the opportumty for
expresSIOn of vlewpomts be balanced, or that any of the counter-advertISmg be responSIve or even relevant to any particular advertIsmg
ExammatIon of the FTC statement to the FCC, as well as other recent
FTC statements, discloses not only that the FTC IS not really Interested
In a FaIrness Doctrme kmd of balancmg but also that ItS counter-advertiSIng proposal IS not really directed at meetmg partIcular flaws of adverusmg. Rather, the FTC IS now attemptIng to move away from the
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unglamorous Job of policmg advemsmg, wluch IS Its statutory funcnon,
and IS undertakIng to promote a general educatlonal program to provIde
consumers wIth all the Informatlon necessary to enable them to mak~
mformed chOIces among products.l l Tlus may, or may not, be a SOCIally desIrable obJectlve; however, It IS not Withm the scope of the Farr:ness Doctrme or Withm the statutory Jurisdictlon of eIther the FCC ,or
.the FTC. Thus, the argument offered by the FTC m support of ItS
ptoposalIS merely a camouflage and does not lOgIcally support the pro.posal at all.
Indeed, the kmd of controversy to wluch counter-advertlSmg relates
IS not the kInd of controversy covered by the Farrness Doctrme. Ad:vertlsmg IS advocacy wluch seeks to persuade a consumer to buy a partlcular brand of product (or servIce) or attempts to establish IdentIficatlon of a partlcular brand With some favorable aSSOCIatlon m the consumer mmd. In the sense that counter-advertIsmg attempts to present
counter-arguments or establish unfavorable aSSOCIatlon, It IS like competltlve advertlSmg. Thus, to some degree, all competltlve advertlsmg
IS counter-advertlSmg, smce the Issues or arguments mvolved all are
rumed at the consumer deCISIOn to buy or not to buy partIcular products
or servIces. However, the Farrness Doctrme applies only to controversIal ISSUes of public Importance. It IS difficult to discern how the
'consumer deCISIon to buy or not to buy partIcular product brands can
nse to the level of an ISSUe of public lffip0rtance, and neIther the FTC
nor any other counter-advertIsmg advocate has yet suggested a means
of bndgmg tlus lOgIcal chasm.
11. The FTC's desIre to remedy sItuatIons m wruch consumers "have no means of
evaluatIng the products and servIces that are offered to them
[while] the business" IS disclosed by the
man wIth whom they deal has all of the relevant mformatIon
author's notes of remarks by COmmIssIoner Mary Gardiner Jones on Oct. 14, 1970, and
of her address to the AustIn AdvertISmg CIinlc of the Uruverslty of Texas School of
CommurucatIon and the AustIn Advernsmg Club, AustIn, Tex., Feb. 21, 1972. Notes
of the author also reveal that Gerald Tham, AssIstant Director, Bureau of Consumer
,ProtectIon, on May 12, 1971, while discussmg the WhIte House Conference on Food,
NutrItIon and Health, remarked that "if food comparues and advertISers do not assume
theIr responsibility for presentIng factual nutrItIonal mformatIon to consumers, and
particularly to children, regulatory agencIes may reqUIre them to do so. See
also Pfizer, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 8819 (July 11, 1972), BNA ANnntuST &
TRADE REG. REp. No. 572, at D-1 (July 18, 1972). In the Statement of the Federal Trade CommIssIon before the FCC, ill F.C.C. Docket No. 19260, the FTC
Stated, mter alia: "In additIon to bemg truthful, It would be desIrable for adverosmg
to be 'complete' 10 the sense that It makes available all essentIal pIeces of mformatIon
concerrung the advernsed product, I.e. all of the mformatIon wruch consumers need
ill order to make ratIonal chOICes among competIng brands of desIred products."
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Furthermore, the FTC suggestion that there IS somethmg bad about
the fact that advertIsed products may have any "undisclosed negative
aspects" and that It could force "all advertisers to disclose all such
aspects" IS not only illogIcal but silly While the FTC IS gIVmg out
WIth mod terms and rappmg wIth jive talk calculated to send contemporary cats, there IS no mdicatlon that It has even a: speakmg acqua:mtance WIth the vast body of knowledge, thought, and wIsdom
accumulated m the fields of philosophy, SCIence, and law Apparently
that's JUst for squares. DIsregarding for the moment the limItations
of tlme m broadcastmg and space m publishmg, the notlon that an advertISer could state all negative aspects of a product or all mformatIOn
needed to make a rational chOIce between products IS naIve at best. The
data that are, or may be, negative or relevant to a product choIce are
literally mfirute.
Moreover, some facts are ObVIOusly more Important to a buyer than
others; relatIve Importance, like relevance, IS a subjective matter, dependent upon the buyer'S desrres, purposes, alternatives, tastes, temperament, and a host of other factors. What IS negative or relevant m the
chOIce among products IS not a fixed, obJective, or determmable thmg.
One buyer may prefer a WIde vanety of relatIvely cheap clothes;
another may want a smgle garment of the rughest quality and pnce and
exclUSIve desIgn. Some may trunk a moderate varIety of medium-pnced
clothes IS best. In varymg crrcumstances, different factors may be relevant for any mdividual. The combmatIon and determmatIOn of elements
of chOIce IS as WIdely vanable as the number of mdividuais. It IS presumptuous to the pomt of bemg false and deceptive for the FTC, or
any other agency, to suggest that It can determme or specify all of the
negative or relevant elements m a buymg chOIce.
The whole truth WIth respect to any phYSIcal product may mvolve
every aspect of human knowledge. Even that, as truly WIse men know,
IS but a tmy fraction of what mIght be called the "whole truth." Sir
Isaac Newton, who contributed as much to human knowledge as any
man who has ever lived, sald of rus own efforts: "I do not know what I
may appear to the world; but to myself I seem to have been only like
a boy playmg on the seashore, and divertlng myself m now and then
finding a smoother pebble or a prettIer shell than ordinary, whilst the
great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me." 12 The FTC
should gIve greater heed to the warrung of William Penn: "Truth often
12. D.

BREWSTER, MEMOIRS OF NEWTON,

vol. II, ch. 27 (1855).
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:suffers more by the heat of Its defenders, than from the arguments of Its
opposers." 13
The fact that not all negatIve aspects 'Of a product can be ascertamed,
specmed, and disclosed does not mean that some shauld nat be. It daes
mean, hawever, that thase charactenstIcs whIch are lffipartant enaugh ta
requIre disclosure m advemsmg must be ascertamed and specmed, praduct by praduct. ThIS IS what the FTC IS suppased to do and what It
has ample authonty to do. Althaugh the assertIon that advertlSmg m Its
present form daes nat disclase all negatIve aspects of advertised praducts
JS necessarily true and will always be true, It has no SIgnificance. Since
It IS lffipassible ta ascertam or specify all negatIve aspects 'Of a praduct,
It IS a lOgICal certamty that they cannot all be disclased. It necessarily
follDws that caunter-advertIsmg wauld nat disclase all negatIve aspects
'Of any praduct. Mareover, there IS nD assurance that caunter-advertISmg wauld address Itself to lffiportant aspects 'Of partIcular praducts. If
the FTC believes that there are negatIve aspects of products whIch reqUIre disclasure, It shauld nat attempt ta evade ItS statutory respanSIbility 'Of performmg the difficult and arduous task 'Of determmmg such
aspects and specifymg them praduct by praduct.
The argument that the FTC daes not have adequate resaurces to perform Its responsibilitIes IS essentIally Irrelevant ta ItS praposal ta reqUIre
counter-advemsmg. The.FTC, like, all ather gavernment agenCIes, IS
allacated that share of our limIted natIanal resaurces whIch the public,
actIng thraugh ItS representatIves m Cangress, determmes ta be appraprIate and reasanable. All ather segments of SOCIety, mcluding advemsers, braadcasters, and the public, also have limIted resaurces. The FTC
IS nat autharIZed or warranted to apprapnate the resaurces of 'Others
not subJect ta ItS JurISdictIan, such as braa~casters 'Or advertIsers agamst
whom na charge has been made, far purpases whIch It approves 'Or
-deems especIally warthy If FTC resources really are madequate ta
perfarm a praper task, It shauld seek additIonal resaurces fram the bady
whIch created and controls It. LlffiltatIans ·af FTC resources da nat
Justify the apprapnatIon far ItS purposes 'Of -the resaurces of others. In
pnvate life there IS a nasty name far such a pracess. The fact that the
FTC senously 'Offers such a reasan m su,ppart 'Of ItS counter-advemsmg
propasal further suggests the absence of any lOgical foundatIan for the
praposal.
13. W PENN, SOME FRUITS OF'SoLITUDE (1693).
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2. Cownter-Advertmng Would, Destroy the Economtc Foundatton of
Broadcasttng
Argument ill favor of the counter-advertIsmg proposal seems to ongmate in a land of mtellectual vacuum where no account IS taken of the
fact that four mmus two equals two, and does not remam four. To gIve
ratIonal consIderatIon to tills proposal, It IS necessary to recogruze some
ObVIOUS and SImple 'facts, most lffiportantly that broadcastmg tIme IS
limIted so that nothmg can be added WIthout subtractmg somethmg else.
CommerCIal broadcastmg IS completely dependent upon advertISmg
revenue. It has no other sIgmficant source of mcome. The only alternatIve method of financmg developed m tills country IS government support or subSIdy, the problems 'Of whIch are the subject of contmumg
public debate and do not need retelling here. It IS s.Igruficant to note,
however, that smce the counter-advertIsmg proposal does not discuss
the multItude of problems and cost to the taxpayers willch would reqUITe
analYSIS if broadcastIng were to be changed from a commerCIal system
to one 'supported by the government, It ostensibly seeks no change In
the system of commerCIal broadcasnng.
Counter-advertIsmg would affect commerCIal broadcastmg m two
ways. First, it would Impose a cost by ItS encroachment on commerCIal
and broadcasnng trnle. Second, It would result m a loss to the extent
ii: would drIve advertIsers out of broadcastmg.
The direct cost Imposed by counter-advertIsmg on broadcastmg
would depend upon the amount of response tIme reqUITed. The proportIon most gen'er-ally discussed and advocated IS twenty percent of
all commerCIal tIme. Counter-advertIsmg advocates would surely not
be satIsfied WIth less. The nme. for such counter-advertIsmg would
have tQ be diverted from tIme now devoted eIther to commerCIals or
prqgrammmg. If .taken from commerCIal tIme, It would decrease proportIOnately the revenue from commerCIals. If taken from programmmg
tIme, counter-advertlsmg would mcrease clutter, program mterruptIons,
and audience annoyance and would decrease advertIsmg effectiveness.14
Since both the FCC and mdustry code authontIes are seeking to limIt
program mterruptIons and clutter, It seems most likely that tIme for
counter-advertIsmg would come from that currently devoted to commerCials.
14. By far the most common complaInt about broadcast commerCIals IS that there
are Just too many of them, WIth about 70 percent of all classes of VIewers 'expressmg
t1us opmIon. ROBERT T. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE l'PBlJ.c...84 (1973). SUJllso ROPER
ORGANIZATION, WHAT PEoPLE TmNK OF TELEVISION AND OnmR' MASS.' MED~A, 1959-1972,
at 24 (1973).
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T akmg total profit as a percentage of gross revenue, the overall profit
margm of the televlSlon mdustry IS under twenty percent. However,
the profit margm of televISIOn networks IS only about five percent and
that of radio less than ten percent, as calculated on the basIS of published FCC data. 15 If twenty percent of commercIal tnne were diverted
to counter-advertISmg, mdustry profit would be elimmated, even If no
other commercIal revenue were lost. Although a myrIad of detailed
calculations can be made as to the cost of counter-advertISIng under
varIOUS linntatIons, the result under relatively severe linntatIons would
still be devastaung. Thus, even if counter-advertISmg were linnted to
some products whIch have been the subject of the most vIgorous attacks,
such as automobiles, gasoline, cereals, drugs, and detergents, and even
if It were placed entIrely m time diverted from commercIals for these
products on a ·one-to-five baSIS and restncted to televIsIOn network commerCIals, It would cost the televISIon networks about $68 million annually, whIch IS more than theIr combmed pre-tax profits of $50 million.
Thus, on the baSIS of direct costs alone, counter-advertlsmg m an amount
suffiCIent to satisfy the ffiIDlffium demands of 1tS advocates would elimmate broadcastmg prpfit.
The total effect of counter-advertlSmg on broadcasung would probably be even more severe. Since 1t IS proposed to apply only to broadcastmg, It would certamly dnve many, and possibly all, advertISers mto
other media. To reach thIs conclUSIOn, 1t need be assumed only that
advertIsers are rational m protectmg theIr own self-mterests. However,
speculation on thIs pomt 1S unnecessary, smce spokesmen for major
national advert1sers have already announced that if counter-advertISmg
measures were limited to products whIch are advertised on broadcast
media, they would aVOId the verbal stomng m the market place of counter-advertIsmg slffiply by usmg other media. Moreover, if a product
could be attacked through counter-advertIsmg whether 1t is ~dvertlSed
on broadcastmg or only through nonbroadcast media, then an advertIser would do best to stop paymg for broadcast advertlsmg and demand
free reply tnne under the Farrness Doctrme when hIs product is attacked.
No matter what mechamcs or rationalizations are employed, counteradvertISmg would result unav01dably m the decreased attractiveness of
broadcastIng as an advertISmg medium, WIth an mevitable decrease ill the
amount of broadcast advertlsmg. The magnitude of such loss is not
crucial to the mqurry, smce the dir.ect~?_sts __ of _sl!PE!~g 1lII1~_,f~1:"
15. These figures were obtamed from the 37th Annual Report· uf the F.C.C: for the
Fiscal Year 1971, at 151 (televlSlon) & 169 (radio).
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counter-advernsmg alone would wIpe out current profit margms; the
loss of revenue resultmg from advertIsers departmg the media would
slffiply make broadcastmg even more unprofitable.
ExperIence wIth CIgarette counter-adVertlSlllg buttresses the concluSIons reached above. First, counter-advertIsmg cannot be limIted by
the FCC to any partlcular product or applicatIOn, smce the courts have
lllsIsted that It be applied to the full extent of whatever logIcal ratIOnale
upon whIch It IS adopted. Second, demands for counter-advertIsmg escalate With ItS use, and even the cessatlon of advertISmg at whIch It IS
directed does not termmate demands for counter-advertlslllg Thrrd,
counter-adverusmg does dimInISh the demand for a product at whIch
It IS directed. Finally, counter-advertlSmg does drIve adverusers out of
broadcastIng. After the CIgarette manufacturers began to feel the
effects 'Of broadcast counter-advernsmg, they told Congress they would
welcome a statute forbIdding broadcast advertlSlng of CIgarettes, and
such a statute was enacted. Although distributors of other products may
achIeve slIDilar results by some other method, there can be no reasonable
doubt that counter-adverusmg would drIve most, If not all, advertIsers
away from broadcastmg to more hospItable media.
3. Counter-Advertmng Would Cause a DeterIOration of Broadcast Prograrmnmg and Journalism

There IS literally no way m whIch counter-adverusmg could be mtroduced mto broadcastmg on any substantIal scale WIthout deterIoratlng
the quality of broadcast programmmg and news reportmg. Complex,
detailed, and lengthy calculatlons are necessary to demonstrate the full
extent to whIch thIs would occur, and the precISe figures will change
from year to year. However, certam general reiatlonships whIch are
farrly constant demonstrate the lffipact that would result. FCC data disclose that m teleVISIOn network operatIOn, expenses exhaust about 95
percent of total revenue, and programmmg costs constltute about 90
percent of all expenses. 16 Takmg teleVISIon networks and statIOns together, expenses are over 80 percent of all revenues, and program costs
-account for about 70 percent of all expenses. The radio networks have
been operatmg at a loss for a number of years, WIth expenses exceeding
revenues and program expenses amountmg to over 60 percent of all expenses.. For radio networks and statIons combmed, total expenses amount
.16. These data were computed from the F.C.C. Report for the Fiscal Year 1971, supra
note 15.
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to about 90 percent of revenue, and program expenses account for about
33 percent of all expenses.
Assummg that commercIal broadcastIng could survIve the substantial
acl9itlOnai cost as well as the loss of revenue Imposed by counter-advertIsmg, It IS obVlous that a substantIal- reductlon of some expenses would
be necessItated. The only Item wruch offers trus possibility IS programmmg, partlcularly m the area of news and public affarrs, where costs are
especIally disproportIonate to the tlme mvolved. A reductlon of expendItures for programmmg and news would reduce the quality; the relatlonsrup IS as sImple and mexorable as anythlng m thIS complex field. It follows that the mtroductlon of counter-advertlsmg mto broadcastIng
would mevitably result m a permanent deterIoratlon of programmmg
and-news reportmg and hasten the deIllise of commercIal broadcaStlng.
4. Counter-Adverttsmg Is Unreasonably Dzscrzmmatory Agaznst
BroadcaSting

-It IS noteworthy that proponents of counter-advertIsmg have not suggested that It be applied to any of the prmt media, billboards, mail, or
other forms of advertIsmg. The proposalliIllltlilg counter-advertIsmg to
the broadcast media IS wholly adventItious and IS made because broadCastIng IS subject to government licensmg and therefore can be subJected to forms of political m:fiuence and control that cannot be exerted
agamst other media. As a matter of SImple lOgiC, if certam types of advertIsmg; or advertISmg for partlcular products, present social problems
requrrmg legal remedies beyond the power of the FTC, then surely
action IS requrred WIth respect to all advertIsmg media. However, there
has not been the slightest hmt" of a belief by the FTC that It, or any
other government agency, has the power to reqUIre nonbroadcast media
to carry counter-advertIsmg; nor IS- there any mdicatIon that the FTC
mtends to ask Congress for such authonty, despIte the fact that substantlal enlarg~ment of Its authorIty IS currendy m the legislative mill.17
Moreover, there has been no suggestion that the counter-advertIsmg
proposal should be applied to the one advertlsmg medium over wruch the
government-clearly has a nght of control. Much of the most obJectionable -advertlsmg IS delivered by the Postal ServIce. Indeed, Congress has
found It necessary to enact legislation permIttmg persons to "turn off"
delivery -p£ particular types of mail advertISmg (although the process IS
more complicated than changmg televlSlon channels) If free counter--17. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1973, at-70, col. 2.
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adverusmg IS a sound proposal for broadcastmg, the same lOgIC would
support a reqUlrement of free delivery of counter-advertIsmg through
the mails. It IS clear, however, that such a measure would be as economIcally mfeasible as IS the proposal for counter-advertIsmg m the
broadcast media.
The Uruted States Supreme Court m 1936 held that a tax on adverusmg m newspapers IS prohibIted by the first amendment because It IS
discrImmatory and mIght result m destroymg both newspaper adverusmg and newspapers. IS The counter-advertIsmg proposal of the FTC
IS no less oppressIve, no less threaterung, and no less discrImmatory
than the tax held unconstItutIOnal m that case. If counter-advertIsmg IS
mdeed a socIally desIrable prInCIple, It should be embodied m a legIslatIve
proposal applicable to all advertIsmg media, mcluding the mails. In Its
present form, the proposal IS IrratIonally and mdefensibly discrImmatory
agamst broadcastIng.
5

Counter-AdvertiSIng Would Not Be In[ormatwe and Would Result
tn Dtatribe Rather than Dzalogue

One of the difficultIes wIth many reform proposals IS theIr presentatIon
m terms of a contrast between the VIces of an actual SItuatIon and the
flawless dream of an hypothetIcal SItuatIOn, between the ImperfectIOns
of reality and the perfectIon of an Ideal. Advocates have mtlmated that
counter-advertIsmg will merely prOVIde tIme for ImpartIal and public
splflted SCIentIsts to gIve ObjectIve and factual little talks on the undisclosed ecologIcal and health dangers of advertIsed products. However,
experIence to date WIth demands for reply tIme to advertIsmg under the
Farrness Doctrme demonstrates that while ImpartIal SCIentIsts are occupIed m theIr laboratones, those who most frequently demand free
broadcastIng tIme to answer advertIsements are, at best, bIased zealots
and, at worst, publiCIty seekers or crackpots.
A recent complamt to the FCC mvolvmg dog food commerCIals
charged that such advertIsmg mIsleads the public mto thmkmg that the
dog IS man's best fnend WIthout warmng of the danger of ammal-borne
diseases. Another complamt demanded tIme to reply to a Umted Fund
appeal m order to urge people not to contribute on the ground that an
mad equate share of the proceeds went to blacks. Other complamants are
vegetarIans and astrology advocates who claIm unfarrness toward theIr
VIews.
18. GrOSjean v. AmerIcan Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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., It IS eVIdent that the mdiVlduals most likely to demand counter-advertISmg tune would not be the well mformed, but the extreIIDsts, the
fanatics, -and the purveyors of odd brands of sOClal,'snake oil cures.
Counter-advertisIng Instituted as a regular part of broadcastIng would
reqUITe an Immense amount of labor on the part of those WIShIng to
make known theIr VIews. Who IS likely to dedicate hImself to such an
effort? Is It the SCIentist workIng on some project of hIs own? Is It
.the busy doctor or the mformed professIOnal dietItIan or engmeer? Or
IS It the college student who IS bored by hIS. studies and resentful of the
establishment, the self-appoInted prophet who marches the streets bearIng a SIgn warnmg of some Impending doom, or the aspIrIng politiCIan
lookIng for publicIty;l Professors may advocate the prmciple of counteradvertISIng, but fanatics will exerCISe the nght.
Both common sense and expenence mdicate that if counter-advertisIng
tune were provIded, It would soon be 'filled 'more With diatribe and' denunCIatIon than WIth factual disclosures or ratIonal disCUSSIOn. It IS al7
together illusory to believe that counter-advertisIng would really be InformatIve.
6. The Counter-Advertmng Proposal Is Based on the False Pre1111.se that
the Consumer Does Not Have Dwerse Informatton Sources
Today's consumers have a plethora of sources from whIch they may
obtam mformaoon concermng advertiSIng clrums. Statements hIghly
cnocal of advertISed products are WIdely carned m all media, mcluding
broadcastIng. Conferences devoted to denunCIatIOn of broadcaStlI1g, the
media, or advertIsmg are WIdely reported, even m the media bemg denounced. The most bItter cntICIsms of broadcastIng and advertlSmg are
·the most frequendy broadcast, apparent:ly on the theory that they are
newsworthy The defects of advertlSed products are reported m news
stones and commentarIes m broadcastIng and the press. Entrre publicanons are devoted to giVIng consumers objective adVIce on the ments of
advertISed products. "Action line" newspaper columns and radio programs not only help mdivIdual consumers but adVIse others of complaInts.
It IS true that advertIsmg messages outnumber counter-advertIsmg
messages, but there IS no eVIdence that they are as mfluentIal. Although
there are no reliable data on the comparatIve potency of advertiSIng,
,counter-advertising, and news, there have been demonstratIons that news
reports are far more mfluenci.al than advertIsmg. A "scare story" about a
product may be enough to dnve It off the market despIte advertlSmg.
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On the other hand, an mcrease m counter-adverttsmg m all Its forms
would not necessarily mcrease Its effectIveness. Counter-adverttsmg may
even defeat Its own purpose by proliferatmg warnmgs agamst adverttsed
products to the pomt that the credibility of leglOmate warnrngs IS reduced. It IS reported that thIS has happened m the case of hexachlorophene,19 and apparently It has occurred wIth cIgarettes. 20 Certamly no
one can claIm that the public IS not mformed and warned about the
dangers of c1garettes, smce every package and advertIsement carrIes ItS
own counter-advertISement.
Similarly, news about many other products and problems IS common
m the media. The public 1S contmually remmded of the problem of aIr
pollutIon and of the contributI'On made to arr pollutIon by automobiles.
The vrrtues and VIces of VarIOUS foods and dietary supplements are matters of daily media comment.
Furthermore, advertlsmg Itself now performs many 'Of the functIons
attributed to counter-advernsmg. Generally, adverttsmg IS hIghly competltIve; It IS the essence of competttIve advertlsmg to urge the superIorIty of one product over another. ThIS IS not mfrequently done by presentIng comparatIve data wIth respect to SIze, performance, 'Or other
qualitles, and frequently comparIsons between competItlve brand products are made. Moreover, the law reqUlres some categorIes of products,
such as drugs, to carry labels contammg speCIfied mformatlOn, and
many labels are begmnmg to read like mmlature treatIses.
These cons1deratlons evoke SuspICIOn that advocates of counter-advernsmg hope It will perform the role of unselling, rather than mformmg. In any event, the available sources of mformatlon concernmg
advertIsed products are so numerous and diverse that the difficulty confrontmg the average consumer IS m copmg WIth the mass of available
data, n'Ot m securmg more.

7 Counter-Advertzsmg Would Dzmzmsh the Amount of Useful Information Available to the Consumer
There are three limmng factors whIch determme the amount of mformatlon anyone can use: the sources, the channels, and the attentIon
span of the mmd. There are more diverse sources of mformatlon about
consumer products than any consumer can now study attentlvely To
the degree that broadcastIng serves as a channel of such mformatIon, the
19. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 26, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
20. Id., Nov. 29, 1972, at 44, col. 1.
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tune and resources available to present obJectlve news and lffipartIal
commentary will mevitably be curtailed if broadcastmg IS requrred to
carry any substantlal amount of counter-advertlSmg. Perhaps more Important, the tolerance of any mdividual for attending to discurSIve expatlatlon on the ments or dements of consumer products IS qUIte limIted.
Advertlsers know that doubling the amount of advemsmg does not
double ItS Impact. Substltutmg a substantlal amount of counter-advertlsmg for eIther programmmg or advertlsmg IS far more likely to rrntate than to mform the audience. 21 The result is likely to be that the
average consumer IS less, rather than more, mformed.
The effect will be even greater on advertlSmg Itself. Although all
advertIsmg will be Withm the target area for counter-advemsmg, the
target's bulls-eye will be factual advertlSmg, a pomt the FTC has already
made clear m Its attacks. So long as advertlSmg IS confined to Identifymg a product and brand name, or even to suggestmg that the consumer
will like Brand X, there IS little to counter. However, as soon as advertIsmg makes tmy assertIon of fact, It opens the door to dispute and
attack. To be subject to counter-advertIsmg, factual claImS need not
be false or mIsleading; if they are, they lie Wlthm the present scope
of FTC power. It IS advertISements not subject to actIon on the ground
of bemg false or mIsleading whIch are the targets of counter-advertlSmg.
In short, a mam purpose of the counter-advertIsmg proposal IS to proVIde a method of disputmg factual claImS whIch cannot be disproved.
To observe the effect of thIS approach, conSIder the types of advertlsmg whIch mIght be used to market a soft drInk:
Dnnk
Burpo
Burpo
Burpo
Burpo
Burpo

Burpo!
tastes good.
makes you feel good.
has vltamm C.
has lots of vltamm C.
wIth vltarmn C IS good for you.

It IS clear that those advertIsements contammg the most factual mformatlon are most vulnerable to attack by counter-advertlsfug. Because thIS
conclUSIon IS already known to advertIsers,22 the net effect of counter21. The most common complamt concernmg televlSlon commercIals IS that they are
too frequent and too long. ROBERT T. BOWER, TELEVISION AND THE PtmLIC 84 (1973).
See also ADVERTISING AGE, June 25, 1973, at 10; ROPER ORGANIZATION, WHAT PEoPLE
THINK OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA, 1959-1972 (1973).
22. The Washmgton Star-News, Feb. 28, 1973, at A-24. ThIS report quotes the Rev.
Robert McEwen, professor of econOmICS at Boston College and president of the
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adverusmg, assummg that broadcastmg and broadcast advertIsmg survIve
Its unplementatlon, would surely be to diImrush, rather than to mcrease,
the amount of mformatIon now available to the average consumer.
8. Counter-Advettismg Is Unfatt to Honest Advertisers

Whatever case may be made for permIttmg counter-advertIsmg m
specIfic cases wIth reference to parucular claIms and products, It IS difficult to construct any ratlonal argument for requIrmg counter-advertlsmg penods devoted to attack 'On any or all advert1Smg Virtually all
product commerCIals are directed to promotmg product brands rather
than to discussmg general ISSUes, and advertIsers are mhibIted by knowledge that they cannot mIsrepresent or mIslead. Counter-advertlsmg advocates, on the other hand, are urunhibIted by any constnctmg prmcIples, and theIr statements already on file wIth the FCC demonstrate
that they are prepared t'O attack all product advertIsmg on such extreme
grounds as the claun that consumers should spend less money for commerCIal products because the mdustrIal establishment of the country IS
already too large and thus mdustrIal produCtIon should be reduced. In
the face of such attacks, adverusers would be confronted wIth the equally
undesIrable alternatIves of eIther conunumg to concentrate on the promotlon of theIr brands, leavmg the attacks unanswered, or of attemptIng,
at substantlally mcreased cost, both to promote theIr brands and defend
theIr SOCIal posmon.
Although the desIrability of decreasmg the GNP may be a legmmate
subject of public debate, there IS no reason why the cost should be borne
by, and the attack directed at, those advertIsers who are unfortunate
enough to use broadcast commercIals. Counter-adverusmg would be a
kmd of public pillorymg of all broadcast advertIsers, wIthout any
charges, mqurry, hearmg, eVIdence, or finding of fault or guilt. Such a
system IS contrary to the most elementary requIrements of due process
and farr procedure and IS symptomatIc of an Impatience WIth due process
of law and an mSIstence on mstant remedies wIthout regard to legal
prmcIples.
For those wIth a knowledge of hIstory, counter-advertIsmg IS SImply
a sophIstIcated modern method of licensmg buccaneers. Once the licensmg IS established, the finanCIal demands, the payoffs, and the blackmail will begm. ThIS pattern has already resulted wIth respect to threatened challenges to broadcast license renewals. To extend thIS system to
Massachusetts ASSOCIatIOn of Consumers, as saymg that "nothmg ads" are a direct
result of FTC efforts to Impose more rIgorous standards on advertlsmg.
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all broadcast advertISers IS to InVIte a massIve new corruption of Amencan commercial life and to fasten a perrucious plague upon honest advertISers.

9 Counter-Adverttsmg Would Create Bars to Innovatton, ImJ!rovement, and Entry of New Products tnto the Market
It IS partlcularly rromc that counter-advertlsmg should be proposed
by the FTC. One of the functIOns of that agency, 1fl addiu0R to policmg advertlsmg, IS to enforce the antitrust laws. An unportant aspect
of such enforcement IS preventIng the erection of econOffilC bars to
market entry Probably the most effective method of mtroducmg a
new or unproved product mto the consumer market IS by advertiSmg.
There may, mdeed, be no other effective way However, It IS the claIm
of novelty, mnovatlon, or unprovement wruch IS most likely to draw
the fire of the antl-advertlsmg bngade.
ThIS phenomenon has been demonstrated m the field of ecology Although some products have been unproved so that they pollute less or
aId m dirnnushmg pollutlon, advertlsmg clauns of such developments
seem to be partlcularly mCItlng to the self-appomted guardians of the
envrronment.23 Moreover, the FTC has mdicated that such clauns are
mherently controversial and subject to rebuttal attack regardless of therr
truth or validity 24
23. See, e.g., Alan F NeckrItz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971), 37 F.C.C.2d 528 (1972) TIns
case Involved the claun of Standard Oil Co. of Califorma that Its patented gasoline
additIve Chevron F-310 reduces unburned hydrocarbons and carbon monmade In automobile exhaust emIssIons by SIgnificant and determmable amounts. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the DistrIct of ColumbIa CirCUIt, complamants, together WIth a
host of amICI CUriae, contended that regardless of the truth of the advernsIng clauns
such advertIsements should be subjected to counter-advernsIng under the FaIrness DoctrIne. ThIS author appeared as counsel for the advertIser, Standard Oil Co. of Califorma. ComplaInants' demands were rejected by the FCC. As of the date thIS
ArtIcle was prepared for publicatIon, the case was still pending before the Court of
Appeals.
24. The Statement of the Federal Trade CommISSIon before the FCC In F.C.C. Docket
No. 19260, part ill, noted In pemnent part:
Many advemsers have responded to the public's grOWIng concern WIth
envrronmental decay by claImIng that therr products contribute to the solutIon of ecolOgIcal problems, or that therr compames are makIng specIal efforts to Improve the envrromnent generally. Similar efforts appear WIth
respect to the public's concern WIth nutrItIon, automobile safety, and a
host of other controversIal ISSUes of current public Importance. While
other approaches could, of course, be deVISed, the most effectIve means of
assurIng full public awareness of OppOSIng POInts of vIew WIth regard to
such Issues, and to assure that OppOSIng VIews have a SIgnificant chance to
persuade the public, IS counter-advertISIng.
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There cannot be any serIOUS doubt that It IS desrrable for products to
be made and sold whIch ameliorate or contribute to the solutIon of envrronmental polluuon problems. ThIs can and will be done only if
there IS some practIcal way to gam entry mto the market for such
products. New or Improved products that meet a public need are tradiuonally mtroduced mto mass markets by advertlSlng. There IS no
equally effecuve alternauve. AdvertIsmg that IS subJect to government
licensed and sponsored attacks IS certamly less effective and less attractIve than advertIsmg wruch IS SImply requrred to be truthful and
accurate. Consequently, It IS certam that whatever other effect It may
have, counter-adverusmg would act as another bar to the entry of new
products mto the market. Such a result not only would operate to mcrease market concentratIOn and decrease competIt1on but also would
tend to discourage the development of new and Improved products, partIcularly those whIch are ecolOgIcally benefiCIal.

10. The Purpose and Effect ot the Counter-Advertmng Proposal Is To
Increase Government Power
A faVOrIte tOpIC of government offiCIals IS the evil of mcreasmg concentratIon of economIC power. There IS no real dispute that the concentrauon of economIC power IS undesrrable; the debate concerns
whether the eVIdence demonstrates an mcreased concentratIon of power
m the prIvate sector. Usually neglected m such diSCUSSIOns IS that concentratIOn of power m public msututIons has about the same SOCIal consequences as undue concentratIon m the pnvate sector, and that econOmIC and SOCIal power has undoubtedly become mcreasmgly concentrated m government m recent years.
The tendency to seek power IS natural. Government offiCIals are not
disembodied spmts mhabIt1ng an ethereal realm where they seek only
some holy grail called "the public mterest." Government offiCIals are
flesh and blood people who are motIvated by Impulses common to all
human bemgs. Probably the maJorIty of mdivIduals employed m and out
of government are motIvated prImarily by the desrre for monetary rewards. However, for most policymakmg offiCIals, m and out of government, the remunerative factor IS less 1ffiportant than conSIderatIons of
personal prestIge and satIsfactIon.
Top executIves m prIvate enterprIse seek money, or profit, at least m
sIgrnficant part as a measure and symbol of success. AchIevement of thIS
obJecuve usually mvolves expanding sales or operatIons so that more
busmess IS transacted and more profit earned. In government the sItua-
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uon IS snnilar, except that the money secured by expanding operauons
IS called "appropnauons" mstead of '~profits", greater presuge and satlS~
facuon, as well as.the success of mcreased appropnauons, IS secured by
mcreasmg the scope of agency operauons through the expanSIOn of
'JurISdicuon or power. As a general rule, busmessmen seek mcreased
profits and government offiCIals seek mcreased power. Busmessmen do
not always seek to mcrease therr profit at whatever cost, and government
offiCIals do not always seek mcreased power. Nevertheless, more often
than not, the profit mouve will be explanatory of busmess aCUon and the
power mouve of government acuon.25 The power moUve IS to govern...
ment what the profit motive 15 to busmess.
The consIStent operauon of the power mOUve can be verified by
anyone reading the newspapers. An example, if any, 'Of a government
agency askIng for dimmlshed JurlSdicuon or less appropnauons would
be extremely rare and relauvely msignificant. On the other hand, any
week's news dispatches from Washmgton will carry numerous accounts
'Of government agenCIes lillpOrtunmg Congress for more power and
more money to exerCIse the mcreased power. The charrman of the FTC
recently testified that the needs of that Comrrussion cannot be apprecIated properly by the Office of Management and Budget and that the
FTC therefore should have the nght to submIt Its budget request directly to Congress, obVIously so that It will be able to ask and get
bIgger appropnauons.26
At first glance the FTC proposal that the FCC reqUIre counter-adverusmg would seem to be mconslStent WIth operatIOn of the power
motive. It appears to be a suggesuon from one agency that another
agency's JurIsdictIon should be expanded. However, the appearance IS
illusory If the FCC adopts the FTC proposal, the FTC will thereby
demonstrate ItS own mfluence. Furthermore, It IS clear that counter-advertIsmg would attract every publiCIty seeker, eccentrIC, and a substantIal poruon of the lunatIc frmge, and would mVIte statements and clauns
more false and decepuve than anythmg appearmg m commercIal advertlSmg. In recogmtIOn of these.possibiliues, the FTC has stated that some
25. See Loevmger, The SOCIology of Bureaucracy, 24 Bus. LAWYER 7 (1968). Cf,
ROBERT N. KHARAsCH, THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE (1973), where It IS contended
that government agenCIes and other bureaucratIc mstItutIons are motIvated mamly by
the purpose of mamtammg therr own eXIStence. While there are some differences m
tmplicatIon between the power hypOthesIS and the InstItutIOnal survtval hypOthesIS as
explanatory of government actIon, they have substantIally the same SIgnificance for the
.analySIS presented m thiS Arttcle.
26. BNA ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 551, at A-17 (Feb. 22, 1971)
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form of regulatIOn or restramt of counter-advertlSlng may be necessary,
lffiplicIdy suggestmg Its availability
AuthorIty to supervISe counter-adVertISlOg claims would expand FTC
power Just at a tIme when that agency IS 10SlOg some of ItS JurISdictIon
m other areas. The new product safety commISSIOn, for example, IS
talang over a sIgmficant segment of the consumer protectIon field formerly held exclUSIvely by the FTC, and the proposed consumer agency
threatens to displace the FTC as the pnncIpal consumer spokesman m
the federal government. Thus, like an mdustrIalist WIth a product that
has become obsolete, the FTC must diversify mto new fields m order to
malOtam Its pOSItIOn.
The counter-adVertISlOg proposal IS only part of the FTC effort to
expand and diversify That agency IS also seekmg to develop ItS own
"faIrness doctrme." In Pfizer, Inc. 27 the FTC declared that It would
henceforth Judge advertIslOg not merely by whether It was false or deceptIve but also by whether It was "faIr" to the consumer. FaIrness,. III
tills sense, means that an advertIser must gIVe the consumer whatever
mformatIon the FTC regards as relevant and Important. Thus, the FTC
IS movmg from the functIon of preventmg false, mIsleading, or deceptIve advertlSmg to the role of establishIng standards based upon ItS concept of what IS best for the consumer.
In ItS search for Increased power, the FTC has both responded to and
encouraged the general hostility to and distrust of bUSIness whIch has
developed In the public m recent years. Like many government agenCIes, the FTC has accepted uncntIcally the Idea that there must be a
politIcal remedy for every problem. Such a premIse leads to the assumptIon that there should be a legal remedy for every complaint. The difficulty, of course, IS that complaInts are easy to VOIce, vary WIdely, and
are often mconsIstent, while legal remedies are difficult to formulate,
relatIvely slow m operatIon, and usually less effectIve than expected, or
even qUIte unforeseeable m effect. Furthermore, complaInts are not
satISfied, even by effectIve remedies, but tend to proliferate and escalate
endlessly, while the power of law IS limIted. As a result, smce It IS literally Impossible to deVIse legal remedies for all complamts, complamers contmually demand more than legal authOrItIes can possibly produce.
Nevertheless, by stImulatIng, encouragIng, and responding to complamts, a government agency can create an actIve constItuency supportmg and encouragIng Its claIms to power. ThIS IS what the FTC has done
27. F.T.C. Docket No. 8819 (July 11, 1972), BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
572, at D-l (July 18, 1972).
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m the past and appears to be the prmcipal motIvatIng force behmd the
counter-advertIsmg proposal. In any event, the FTC has pleased Its
constItuents.
If the proposal were adopted, the FCC would soon find Itself m an
area completely alien to It and one for whIch It lacks staff, experIence,
and apprOprIatIOns. If the FCC were rash enough to reach for the FTC
counter-advertIsmg chestnuts, It would thus have to turn to the FTC for
help m aVOIding the fire. The mevitable result would be a vast expansIOn
of the JUrIsdictlon of the FTC wIthout any actIon by Congress or the
courts and wIthout a scmtilla of statutory authorIty In effect, the FTC
would have borrowed authorIty from the FCC to mcrease ItS own
power. In the annals of government power-seekmg, thIs would rank as
a great coup d'etat.

11. Counter-Advertzszng Would Increase the Power of Small Militant
Groups
Behmd every powerful government agency there stand mterested
socIal or econOmIC groups. For years It has been charged that speCIalized
regulatory agencIes were unduly responsIve to the mdustry group they
regulated. AgencIes like the FTC, however, have until recently lacked
the support of cohesIve pressure groups. With the me of militant and
aCtlVlSt consumer movements, the FTC suddenly has found Itself a pressure group. It has attempted to cement ItS developmg alliance by bemg
hIghly responsIve to ItS constItuency's demands for new remedies.
The counter-advertIsmg proposalts one such response. Although the
FCC had held a WIde-open mqmry on the applicatIon of Its FaIrness
Doctrme to commerCIals, and although the most actIVIst and artIculate
consumer advocates had commented m that hearmg, no one had yet suggested as radical and far-reachmg a proposal as the FTC counter-advertlSmg scheme. The reactIon from the antI-advertIsmg gang was sImilar
to what would be expected from the oil mdustry if the Internal Revenue
SerVIce proposed mcreasmg the oil depletIon allowance to 50 percent.
If the FTC proposal were adopted, there would be lffiffiediate need
for the productIOn and presentatIon of a vast number of counter-com:..
merciais. These would certamly not come from advertIsers 'Or theIr
agenCIes. The only plausible source would be the aCtIVlSt groups now
supportmg the FTC proposal. Such groups would thus be m the same
posmon that a busmess enterprISe would occupy if It were given a gift
of 10 or 20 percent of all broadcast commerCIal time. The Ideas of thIs
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little group would suddenly assume l1llmense l1llp0rtance, and Its mfluence would be greater than that of any busmess or advertISer. The
group would assume seIDl-officIal statTls, smce the FTC and FCC
would, of neceSSIty, have to deal wIth ItS self-proclaImed leaders. ThIs
scenano IS not mentioned m the FTC statement; however, thIS IS the
way reality works.
Although these small, aCtiVIst, militant groups would obtam a large
measure of political and economIC power, there would be no assurance
that theIr obJectives at all comcided WIth the mterests of the mass of
consumers. No mecharusm has been suggested or devIsed to test, much
less msure, such representatIOn. In fact, the agencIes have expressed little
concern about thIS questIOn, as verbal volume seems to be more Important than supporting numbers. Nevertheless, It IS qUite clear that the
Opposltlon to such groups IS substantial. The head of a federal agency
was applauded by hundreds of women leaders when she told them that
televISIOn's "inordinate amount of time gIven to dissenters, protesters,
and ne'er-do-well radicals IS mcomprehensible-and dangerous." 28 ThIS
and other mdicatIons suggest that It IS Imprudent and unwarranted to
take a step that can result only m gIvmg much additIOnal power and
media exposure to a small, vocal, but unrepresentatIve group.29
12. Counter-Adverttsmg Would Meet No Real Need and Solve No

Important Problem
It IS banal to say that we are confronted With many Important and
senous problems today The FCC requIres broadcasters to survey the
needs and mterests of theIr commurutIes, and, m effect, to ascertam and
respond to commuruty problems. As Senator Hartke has noted, the files
of the FCC prOVIde a nch mme of SOCIal mformatIon. 3o Perusal of these
and other sources reveals many problems about whICh people are concerned, but advertIsmg IS practically never mentioned. War, CrIme,
housmg, raCIsm, mflatIon, the economy and unemployment, drugs, taxes,
28. WashIngton Star-News, Dec. 7, 1972, at B-2; WashIngton Post, Dec. 7, 1972,
at L-l, col. 1-6.
29. As JustIce Douglas has SaId In an analogous case: "In 1973-as In other yearsthere IS clamorIng to make the TV and radio emit the messages that console certain
groups." Columbia BroadcastIng System v. Democratic Nat'l COmmIttee, 93 S. Ct.
20BO, 2112 (1973) (concurring opInIOn). The opinIOn of the Court In that case states
that the Court cannot accept the "view that every potential speaker IS 'the best Judge'
of what the listerung public ought to hear or Indeed the best Judge of hIS or her
Views. All Journalistic tradition and experIence IS to the contrary" ld. at 2097
30. 139 CONGo REc.14,362 (daily ed. Sept. 8,1972).
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malfeasance m government, and sunilar matters are the problems wInch
.concern people. AdvertIsmg IS at most a penpheral and at least a synthetic problem.
No doubt there are advertIsmg Qbuses. There always have been, and
probably always will be, abuses of every freedom. There contInue to
be false, ITIlsleading, and deceptive advertIsements, although these are
clearly fewer m proportion to the total amount of advertlSmg than has
been the case m the past. The FTC has ample power to deal WIth such
abuses; morever, broadcast mdustry agenCIes are assummg an mcreasmgly sIgmficant role m detectIng and preventIng abuses.
Indeed, the'FTC has stated that wherever product safety IS mvolved,
"scrupulous accuracy m advertlSmg clanns" 31 IS requrred, and that "it
lS unlawful not to affirmatIvely reveal any liITI1tatIons wInch may m fact
eXist" 32 or to fail to disclose the limIts of safety clanns. The FTC also
mSIsts that "advertisers are held to a hIgh standard of care m makIng
I~presentatIons mvolvmg the safety of therr products m order to assure
to the greatest extent possible that therr clanns will not be ITIlsunderstood
by the public." 33 In light 'Of these standards, It cannot be contended that
counter-advertlSmg IS necessary WIth respect to the safety of advertIsed
products. Even beyond matters of safety, the FTC has stretched the
liITI1ts of reasonableness m reading Implied clauns mto advertlSmg and
requrrmg disclosures or disclanners wherever there IS any possibility that
advertIsmg clauns may ITIlslead. Thus, It cannot be asserted that counteradvertlSmg IS requrred to remedy any abuses mvolvmg falSIty, ITIlsrepresentatIon, or deception of any kInd.
The rromc fact seems to be that advertlSmg today IS not at all menacmg but IS sunply annoymg. The _current complamts about advertIsmg
are that so much of It IS rrntatIng and bormg. These qualities have been
exacerbated by the hIghly VIsible and mtruSIve nature of teleVISIon advertIsmg, and counter-advertIsmg would sunply make matters worse.
Counter-commercIals would surely be less profesSIOnal and more poleITIlc
and pedestnan than commerCIals. They would certaInly be as bormg as
commercIals, and, by adding to the volume of gabble and clutter, they
would make broadcast advertIsmg even more rrntatIng to the public.
Although there IS a certam amount of advertlSmg whIch almost all of
us find distasteful, thIS IS not a SOCIal problem. The pnce we pay for
free speech IS toleration 'Of distasteful and abUSIve expreSSIOn. If we
31. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., F.T.C. Docket No. 8818 (Sept. 22, 1972).
-32.ld.
33.ld.
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permlt only that speech whIch we find tasteful and agreeable, there IS no
free speech. Freedom eXists only when we permIt that whIch we dislike
and disapprove. Similarly, the pnce we pay for a free economy IS toleratIon of distasteful expressIOn and excesses. An economy IS not free when
standards of taste and acceptability are prescribed by the state and devIatIons are subject to sanctIOns. There must, of course, be ultImate limIts
of socIal tolerance set by law AdvertIsIng whIch IS false,. mIsleading, Of
deceptIve IS, and should be, prohibIted and pumshed. Withm these limItS,
however, a free economy cannot afford the ImpOSltlOn of officIal standards of propnety or acceptability
Counter-advertISIng IS an attempt to do Just that. It IS an effort to'
meet- the loud vocal demands of a small group whIch has become the
FTC constituency, even at the cost of mtroducmg new economIC Impediments to entry and Innovatlon and other rIgIdities and distortIOnsmto the marketIng process. It IS not a response to any crymg abuse, need,.
or problem, and It IS not discernibly related to any Important socIal need
or problem.

13. Counter-Adverttstng Would Create a Host of New Problems, Including Possible Governmental Interference wtth the First Amendment Rtght to Free Speech
Although counter-advertIsIng would not solve any problems, It would
certaInly create some real ones.34 Most sIgruficantly, any attempt by the
government to determIne wmch spokesmen and whIch vIewpomts should
be heard dunng tlme devoted to counter-advertisIng would result III the
government's settIng the agenda for the Issues to be heard by the public, a
SItuatIOn hardly conSIstent WIth the freedom 'Of speech contemplated by
the first amendment. Furthermore, although the FTC suggests the POSSIbility of limItatlons and prohibltlons on the content of counter-advertlsmg, there does not appear to be any legal baSIS for the exerClse of such a.
power. The FTC has no JunsdictIOn to control any expressIOn of VIews
concermng products by persons not engaged m trade In such products. 3s
As mdicated by cases whIch have already come before the FCC, It
appears certam that the counter-commercIal spokesmen will make state34. The Supreme Court has noted that the attempt to provIde free broadcastmg tune
to those unable to afford commercIal time would raIse "incredible admmIStratIVe problems." Columb13 Broadcastmg System v. Democratic Nat'l CommIttee, 93 S. Ct.
2080,1097 n.17 (1973)

35. Globe Cardboard Novelty Co. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951); ScIentific
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941)
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ments wIuch advertISers will regard as false, deceptive, and unfarr. Will
-the advertISers then be entitled to reply tlme under the Farrness Doctnne, or will advertISers be reqUIred to purchase additional commercIal
-tlme to reply to attacks on counter-commercIal tlme? In eIther event,
-advertISers will be put to the burden and expense of defending them.selves agamst charges wIuch are, m effect, sponsored by the government,
-even though no government agency will have mvestIgated them 'Or determmed that they should be brought. An even more troublesome pos.sibility IS that not only will advertISers not be gIven free reply tlme,
they may be unable to purchase commercIal tlme because the broad-caster may have reached Ius commerclallimtt WIth the added 'burden of
,counter-commercIals or may be unwilling to mcur the added nsk of
further reJomders if he perIIDts an advertISmg response to counter-advertISIng attacks. Under such CIrcumstances, advertIsers would be at
-the mercy of the most Irresponsible and extreIIDst factions or mdivlduals.
There IS also the probability, vergmg on certamty, that counter-adver:tlSmg VOICes would raIse innumerable controversIal political and socIal
.ISsues, as they have already done. These ISSUes mclude such modest pro'posals as limttIng pnvate expenditures, mcreasmg taxation and government expenditures on public projects generally, prohibItIng pnvate automobiles and mternal combustion engmes, mcreasmg our reliance on
.atoIIDC power, prohibltmg further construction of atoIIDc power plants,
'prohibItIng such products as personal deodorants, and prohibItIng the
.sale of any drugs over the counter or the broadcast advertIsmg of any
.drugs, mcluding aspmn. How a broadcaster could mamtam any balance
in the face of such contentions, whether he would have to double the
<counter-advertISmg tlme and prOVIde counter-counter-advertIsmg, and
whether broadcastmg would become nothmg but a medium for debate
-between the most diSSIdent groups m SOCIety and theIr opponents are all
problems squardy presented by the FTC proposal. However, no answers are so much as hmted.
" The more closely the proposal IS exammed, the more complex the
questions become, and there IS no mdicatIon that any effort has or will
be devoted to arnvmg at solutions bef'Ore It IS too late. What are the
nghts of a producer who believes that the advertIsed clrums of supenonty for a product competitive to Ius -are exaggerated or false? Does
-a seller have the nght to use counter-advertIsmg tlme to correct what
he regards as the IIDsleading claImS of.a competitor? Orsuppose It-IS
_discovered _-:that some ardent counter.,.adv~rtlsmg. advocate IS, m fact,
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subsI<lized, advIsed, or connected' wIth the competItor of an advertISer
who IS attacked? What mecharusm can prevent such mCIdents, and
how can they be farrly handled when they occur if counter-adver.tlSmg
IS mstItutIOnalized?
These are only a few of the manifold problems that will surely anse
if the FTC counter-advertlsmg proposal IS Implemented. The result IS
a scheme wruch neIther solves nor responds to any Important problem
but wruch would certamly create at least several maJor problems. A
charItable conclusIOn IS that the proposal was not well consIdered.
14. Cownter-Advertzsmg Is the Antztheszs of Free Speech

Counter-advertIsmg IS urged m the name of free speech; mdeed, on
first ImpressIon It may seem that offermg tIme to speak agamst the
volume of broadcast commercIals IS an expanSIOn of the nght of free
speech. More careful exammatIon of the proposal, however, demonstrates that the free speech claIm IS qUlte speCIOUS and that counter-advertlSmg IS, by Its very nature, government-mandated and controlled
speech, not free speech.
Suppose that the FCC adopted a requrrement for counter-advertIsmg
and that some public-spmted engmeer demanded orne to assure consumers that Chrysler cars really are engmeered better than others. Can
one conceIve that he would be heard? Or suppose that a labor leader
requested tune to urge that consumers should buy domestIc rather than
unported products-automobiles, textiles, cameras, shoes, whatever-and
to adVISe people what brands were manufactured by umon labor m thIS
country Does anyone unagme that such a plea would be gtven counteradvertlSmg tIme? It IS the OppOSIte vIewpomts-that automobiles are not
well engmeered or that domestIC products are produced m sweatshop
conditIons-whIch would surely be welcomed by counter-advertlsmg
"sponsors." Although counter-adverttsmg advocates mIght WIsh to
quarrel Wlth thIS formulatIon of acceptable and unacceptable VIews, the
SIgnificant pomt IS that mherent m the very concept of counter-advertlsmg IS the Idea that certaIn vIewpomts are entItled to a government
mandate compelling therr broadcast.
Thus, the demand for counter-advertlsmg tIme IS not a demand for
free speech at all; rather, It IS a demand that the government sanctIon and
mandate a partIcular land of speech and the expresSIOn of some speCIal
viewpomt. The proposal IS wrong m prmclple and daI?-gerous as
precedent. If the government can mandate the expreSSIOn of a specIfic
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vIewpomt m the econqnuc realm, It can do so WIth equru: logtc and
proprIety m the politIcal realm,3s At thIs pomt, all pretense of free
speech, an open socIety,. and politIcal democracy vamsh, -and the whole
'scheme becomes apparent for what It Is-an effort to. use the power
of government to promote the expressIon of a partIcular vtewpomt held
by a favored artIculate group. Such an effort IS not redeemed by toe
fact that thIs group marches today under the banner of "·consumerISm."
Tomorrow the same group, or some other group WIth the. same demand
for government support of ItS vIewpomt, may march under the banner
of natIOnal SOCIalism or commumsm, or some other Ideology The proposal that the government mandate the broadcast expressIOn of any
speCIal vIewpomt, no matter how defined, IS basIcally subverSIve, InconSIStent With, and dangerous to the AmerIcan prmciple of government
neutrality and protectIon of free speech.37
It IS no secret that every adffiilllStratIon believes that news reportlng
and commentary on ItS aCtIVItIes IS unfarr. Since the functIon of the
36. In ColumbIa Broadcastmg System v. DemocratIc Nat'l CommIttee, 93 S. Ct. 2080
(1973), It was argued that the FCC was reqUIred to mandate the broadcastmg of partIcular politIcal VIews. The FCC had rejected thIS argument 10 DemocratIc Nat'l Comffilttee, 25 F.C.C.2d 216 (1970), and Busmess ExecutIves Move for Vietnam Peace, 25
F.C.C.2d 242 (1970) However, a maJonty of the Court of Appeals for the Distnct of
ColumbIa CirCUIt ruled that broadcasters could not refuse editonal advertIsements expressIng politIcal VIews, as a matter of policy, and that the FCC had the power and the
duty to deterffilUe whIch editonal advertISements (and therefore whIch politIcal VIews)
broadcasters were reqUIred to present. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). ThIs deCISIOn was
reversed by the Supreme Court.
37. See Columbia BroadcastIng System v. DemocratIc Nat'l Comffilttee, 93 S. Ct.
2080, 2098-99 (1973), where the Supreme Court observed that a government-mandated
"rIght of access" to broadcastIng mvolves "the rISk of an enlargement of government
" The Court
control over the content of broadcast diSCUSSIOn of public ISSues.
contmued:
Under a constItutIonally commanded and government supervISed rightof-access system urged by respondents and mandated by the Court of
Appeals, the [Federal COmmUOlCatIons] CommISSIOn would be reqUIred to
oversee far more of the day-to-day operatIons of broadcasters' conduct, deCIding such questIons as whether a partIcular mdiVIdual or group has had
suffiCIent opporturuty to present Its VIewpOInt and whether a partIcular
VIewpomt has already been sufficiendy arred. Regmtentmg broadcasters IS
too radical a therapy, for the ailments respondents complam of.
• The COmmISSIOn'S responsibilitIes under a nght-of-access system
would tend to draw It Into a contmuIng case-by-case deterffilUatIon of who
should be heard and when. Indeed, the likelihood of Government mvolvement IS so great that It has been suggested that the accepted constItutIonal
pnnciples agamst control of speech content would need to be relaxed WIth
respect to editonal advertISements. To sacrifice First Amendment protectIons for a speculatIve gam IS not warranted.
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media IS to CntlCIZe, rather than to tout, the operatlon of government,
there may mdeed be some basIS for such VIews. The logIc of counteradverosmg would warrant the government m reqmrmg the establishment of a regular pro-admmIstratlOn broadcastmg perIod when only
spokesmen favorable to the current adIrurustratlon would be allowed to
speak. LOgIcally thIs would lead to a demand that a specIfic perIod be
set aSIde for the Opposltlon vIewpomt; very shortly the detenrunatIOn
of what vIewpomts should be expressed and what spokesmen heard
would be entIrely a functlon of some government agency It cannot be
serIously mamtamed that thIS would be free speech or a practIce permIssible under the :first amendment.
It IS unnecessary to deCIde whether the prmcIple of counter-advertlSmg would be extended beyond the proposal now before the FCC.
That proposal Itself only masquerades as free speech. Its true essence
IS the absolute antlthesIS of free speech. Counter-advertIsmg, by Its very
nature, IS government-mandated and controlled speech, and represents
the epItome of government control whIch the :first amendment was deSIgned to outlaw forever m thIS country m order to preserve truly free
speech. It must always be remembered that It IS a free press, not a "faIT"
press, that IS requIred by the ConstItutIOn.3S Freedom m a large and
diverse country will ultImately produce faIrness, but a governmentbalanced "farrness" cannot produce freedom.
Broadcastmg today carnes much counter-advertISmg materIal. It IS
the prmcIple of government mandate and control that IS objectIOnable
m the present proposal. The exerCISe of government power to establish
perIods for the broadcast expreSSIOn of any government-specIfied or controlled vIewpomt IS mherently contrary to the whole concept of free
speech and free press. 39 In that sense, counter-advertIsmg IS a dangerously subversIve proposal.

15. The Coumer-Advertzsmg Proposal Can Be Explatned Only as a
Polittcal Power Play
When examIned analytIcally, the counter-advertIsmg proposal SImply
makes no sense from the lOgIcal, economIC, or SOCIOlOgIcal vIewpomt. It
can be understood only when analyzed m politIcal terms.
38. As JustIce Stewart observed m hiS concurrmg opmlOn m Columbta Broadcasttng:
''Those who wrote our First Amendment put their faith m the proposltIon that a free
press IS mdispensable to a free society. They believed that 'fairness' was far too
fragile to be left for a government bureaucracy to accomplish. History has many
tImes confirmed the wisdom of their choice." 93 S. Ct. at 2108.
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The first and most ObVIOUS effect of counter-advertIsmg would be to
Impose substantial additional cost on broadcastIng and drIve at least
some advertlSmg away, thus reducmg revenue. By almost any calculatIon, trus would WIpe out the overall profit margm of both radio and
teleVISIOn. UltImately, because of ever-mcreasmg needs for subSIdy or
support, broadcastIng would become .subJect to government control.
Presumably trus process would be gradual, durmg wruch tIme broadcasters would be mcreasmgly subject to the mfluence and control of the
most militant and perSIstent counter-advertIsmg advocates. 4o These
groups certamly have reason to believe that government agenCIes wruch
adopt theIr counter-advertIsmg proposal despIte the strong ObjectIons to
It will contmue to be responSIve after substantIal control of broadcastmg
has moved from present management to government.
Whether counter-advernsmg would result m an expansIOn of what
now IS referred to as "public broadcastIng" or whether It would produce
some new form of government subSIdy and control of present commerCIal broadcastIng facilitIes IS an urumportant detail. The Impact will
surely be to transfer effective control from the numerous diverse licensees now operatmg the more than eIght thousand licensed statIons41 to
some government agency controlled by the politIcal admInIstration of
39. Although Columbta' Broadcasting resulted m SIX separate Opmtons, It IS notable
that five JUStices (Burger, Whlte, Blackmun, Powell and RehnqUlSt) thought that the
proposal for government-mandated access to broadcastmg was contrary to the public
mterest and mvolved a dangerous exteuslOn of government control over speech, while
two other JUStices (Douglas and Stewart) thought the danger of extending government
control over speech was so great as to contravene the first amendment. Only two Justices (Brennan and Marshall) favored OffiCIally mandated access to broadcastmg facilities.
In, VIew of the recent disclosures of offiCIal aCtiVIty m the "Watergate" mvestlgatlons,
one wonders how any believer m democracy can favor any proposal to mcrease government power or mfluence over the mass media m any respect.
40. In Columbta Broadcastmg, the Court noted that broadcasters are likely to be
more responsible and accountable than those who Importunately seek access to broadcast facilities: "No such accountability attaches to the private mdividual, whose only
qualificatlous for usmg the broadcast facility may be abundant funds and a pomt of
VIew. To agree that debate on public ISSUes should be 'robust, and wide-open' does not
mean that we should exchange 'public trustee' broadcasong, WIth all Its limItations, for
a system of self-appomted editOrial commentators." 93 S. Ct. at 2097-98.
41. As of May 31, 1973, there were 7,756 commercial radio and teleVISion stations
and 914 educational FM and televlSlon stations authOrIZed to broadcast, for a total
of 8,670 authorIZed broadcastmg stations. Of thIS number, 7,538 commercial radio and
teleVISion stations and 823 educational FM and teleVISion stations were actually on the
aIr, for a total of 8,361. BROADCASTING, July 9, 1973, at 48.
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the country and responsIve to the most militant advocates of a favored
viewpoillt.
BasIcally, the counter-adverusmg proposal IS Slillply an echo of the
demand that the power of busmess be curbed and that the power of
government agencIes and therr politIcally militant supporters be mcreased. Busmess and Journalism, both prmt and broadcast, are the two
groups ill contemporary socIety strong enough to offer some sIgmfi.cant
OppOSItIOn to and CntICISm of government. In recent years, although
government control of busmess has been extended m many ways, the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press have been mamtamed.
Further extenSIOn of government controls may endanger these freedoms,
particularly when such controls are directed at the economIC foundation
of the Journalism busmess.42
The FTC IS now busily engaged ill extending ItS power over advertIsmg. If counter-advertIsmg IS mstltuted, government agenCIes will have
the power to encourage and direct attacks on busmess WIthout any responsibility for such attacks, and will also have the power to control a
large part of the public discourse m a manner never before attempted
ill thIs country The combmatIon of these powers, together WIth illcreased economIC power over the broadcastmg medium, would create
a degree of government control over AmerIcan SOCIal and political life
that 1S unprecedented m our hIStOry No complamts about advertIsmg
have ever charged abuses grave enough to Justify such a threat to our
fundamental rIghts.
The maSSIve power held by the government should not be mobilized
for any causes but those havmg genume SOCIal sIgmfi.cance. The abuses
whIch the FTC now clalills to be attackmg are at worst perIpheral annoyances. The damage whIch the FTC proposal may cause to our
SOCIal, economIC, and politIcal structure IS vastly greater than any mJury
whIch IS likely to result from the annoyance of advertIsmg abuses.
The bIg story today IS not what advertlSmg IS domg to politiCS, but
what politics IS domg to advertIsmg. Politics 1S attemptmg to turn advertlSlng on ItS head by establishmg counter-advertIsmg, an effort whIch,
if successful, would change advertIsmg from an illstrument of competItion m a free economy to a servant of government and an mstrument of
propaganda or government-sanctioned viewpomts. Freedom of the press
would be endangered, and the political process Itself would run the fISk
of subverSIOn. Defeat of the counter-advertIsmg proposal will not merely
42. Compare the statement of the Supreme Court
AmerIcan Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

In

note 37 supra 'Wtth Grosjean v.
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save the mstItutIon of advertlSmg and help preserve a competitive economy, It will also help to preserve the democratic values of Amencan
politics.

